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IMPLIED WARRANTY OF QUALITY IN SALES.

There is

probably no portion of the law which is

subject to more constant change and additions than that relating to sales of Personal Property.

The continual increase

in conmerce gives birth to new questions and materially modifies established doctrines.
The doctrine of implied warranty of quality is one of
the main branches of the law of sales.

The quantity of

an article bought and the price to be paid for it are points
which are not usually misstated by the contracting parties;
these are usually definite and certain, of the essence of the
contract, easily and quickly expressed and seldom cause misunderstanding, but the other essential.. of the

contract of

sale not so easily determined in itself which requires a certain knowledge and judgment and in some cases the highest degree of skill is the quality of the article.
Implied warranties in contracts of sale are divided into

two parts:
First,

Implied warranty of title;

Second,

Implied warranty of quality of the goods sold.

As the title indicates, what we have to say on this subject will be confined to the second diviuion.
The coiixion law rule of caveat emptor (lot the buyer beware) probably owes its origin to the fact that in earlier
times nearly all sales of goods took place in market overt
and fairs where the 1ona fide purchaser without notice obtai:.s
the goods taking his own ctances as to their quality but as
to title, that was good against all the world, except the
Crown.
The common law did not annex a warranty to any contract
of sale.

It seems that nothing chort of a diroct affirm-

ation would be construed by the courts to be an express warranty and then it must be intended as such by the parties.
Its policy has been defended on the ground that it tends to
diminish litigation, but the tendancy of modern courts is to
limit its ecope, in fact it has had so many exceptions piled
upon it that it must surely be proved by this time, if except-

tions prove a rule.
Caveat emptor "pplied to all sales of personal property
except where the vendor gave an express warranty.
said to be such a commendation or affirmation

,

at the time

of sale, as are supposed to induce the purchaser.
cise words are necessary;

This is

No pre-

it is sufficient that if the inten-

tions of the parties clearly appear.

During the time of Lord

Holt the doctrine was established, that to warrant no formal
words were necessary, therefore a warranty might be implied
from the nature and circumstances of the case.

And one of

the circumstances which was finally recognized,as pointing to
the soundness of the article was the price paid for it, and
the maxim that a sound price imports a sound article was introduced.
This doctrine is still adhered to in South Carolina,
(nulwinkle v. Cramer, 27 S.C., 376.)

It was afterwards ex-

ploded by Lord Mansfield, since which time it has undergone
some modifications in the English and American courts, tendimn
in the former somewhat, and in some of the states :f the
Union to the rule of the civil law, which implies that the

-4goods sold must be merchantable and fit for the purpose for
which they were bought. (Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B.,

207).

This doctrine is developed in a long line of cases upon this
subject sufficiently illustrated by Merchie v. Cornell, (155
Mass. 60. )

The contract was for the sale and delivery of

a cargo of ico.

The judge in writing the opinion says:"Tbe

inference is warranted that the thing to be furnished must be
not only a thing of the name mentioned in the contract but
something more.

How much more may depend upon circumstances

and at times the whole question may be for a jury.

If a

very vague generic word is used, like' ice', which taken literally may be satisfied by a worthless article, and the contract is a cormercial contract, the court may properly instruct the jury that the word moans more than its bare definition in the dictionary, and calls for a merchantable article
of that name.
performed. "

If that is not furnished the contract is not
This rule is now well settled in England as is

shown by the case of Shepherd v.

Kain,

(5 B.& A.,240)

.

This

was an action for a breach of warranty, the vessel was advertised and sold as a copper fastened vessel, but sold as she

-5It

lay with all faults.
tially

copper-fastened,

appeared that she was only par-

and not what is

a coppor-fastened vessel.

known to the trade as

It was held that with all faults

must be understood all faults which a copper-fastened vessel
may have and that the buyer was entitled to damages as it was
not what the-description called for.

If the seller was ig-

norant of the fact the vessel was not a copper-fastened vessel
by all reason and legal principle he should be held for damages as it did not fulfil the description, but if on the
other hand it could be shown that he had knowledge of the fact
his responsibility rests of the ground of fraud.

In all

these contracts the question is simply whether the seller has
furnished substantially what the buyer bargained for.

If

the article does not in fact answer the description it does
not do so more or less whether the defect could have been
discovered or avoided or not.

But there are cases in which

the probability of knowledge on the -.
art of the vendor is
so strong that the courst will presume that it existed without p:coof,

and in

these cases the vendor is

on an implied warranty.

held responsible

As for example in the case of

-6White v.

i1iller, (

71 N.Y.,

118. )

The plaintiff relied

upon the seller's superior ability to know the cabbage seed
which he was buying as " Large Bristol Cabbage" and was expected to produce cabbage of that variety, was free from any
latent defects arising from the mode of cultivation.
The law places this extra obligation upon the seller
from this very fact thet

he had a better opportunity of know-

ing and examining the quality of the goods than the buyer.
The extent to which the vendor was formerly held liable on
an implied warranty in a contract of sale is worthy of comparison with his present liability.

In the earlier cases

the most extreme rule was formulated in the endeavor to escape from the civil doctrine and it even went so far as to
set aside implied warranty entirely.

For Qt- instance t1B

famous case of Chandelor v. Lopus, decided in 1603, ( Cro.
Jac. 4), was an action on the case for selling a stone representing it to be a bezar stone when it was not.
justices and barons ( except Anderson C.J.

All the

) holding

"

that

a bare affirmation that it was a bezar stone, without warranting to be so is no cause of action;

and although the defend-

-7,
ant who was a gold-smith knew it to be no bezar stone, it is
not material;

for every one in selling his wares , said the

judge will affirm that his wares are good, or that
is sound;

his horse

yet, if he does not warrant them to be so there is

no cause of action."

This doctrine sounds as strangly to

our oars as the modern doctrine of implied warranty would have
sounded to the judges in the time of Jas.I..

And one of the

first opinions which began to change the courts on this subject was written by Mir.Baron Parker in the case of Barr v.
Gibson, decided in 1825, in which he says," But the bargain
and sale of a chattel, as being of a particular description,
does imply a contract that the article sold is of that description."

This is the docttine now prevailing.

It wes

adopted as the law of this State in the case of Hawkins v.
Pemberton, in 1872, (51 N.Y., 198).

And yet that ancient

doctrine was the guiding star in beth England and America
until far into the present centtry.
The cases of Sexias v.

Wood, (2 Caines, 48)

decided as

recently as 1825, and Sweet v. Colgate, ( 20 Jr. 196, ) decided
about the same time were based mainly upon the authority of

-0--

the case.

of Chandelor v.

Lopus-,

are adverse to this view.

But the case of Chandelor v. Lopus
England,

and t1r cases in

A

Wood,

has been overruled in

this State referred too have often

and Chancellor Kent who took part in

been questionei,
Seias v.

,

deciding

intimates in his commentaries a doubt whther
A

the case was correctly decided. ( 2 Kent, 479).
doctrine as it appears to ;me is

This moderh

more reasonable and proceeds

interpretation of the contract of sales.
upon a iust
A

A deal-

er who sells an article, describing it by the name of an
article

of commerce,

tlr

identity of which is

known to'Lthe

purchaser must understand that the latter relies upon the debythe seller that it is the thing
scription asarepresentation
A
described.
Wv'e will now turn out attention to another division of
our subject which relates to the sale of goods fit for a particular purpose.

The subject is to be divided into two

parts:
First,

Where the seller is not the manufacturer

Second,

Where the seller is the manufacturer.

2

, The general law as it now stands is pretty clearly

-0lid down on this point and aptly applied in an Oregon aase,
Morse v. Union Stock Yard Co.,

( 21 Oregon, 289.).

The

plaintiff, who was a butcher, ordered of the defendants, who
kept a stockyard, to

"

get two car9 loads of good beef cattle".

The cattle were not of the quality orcb rod
purpose intended.

,

or fit for the

Judge Lord in his opinion sys

u When a

dealer undertakes to supply goods or chattels in which he
deals that are to be applied to a particular purpose, and the
buyer necessarily trusts to the judgment of the dealer there
is an implied warranty that they shall be reasonably fit for
the purpose for which they were intended."

This is more ob-

vious when the seller is also a manufacturer, but it is equally true when he is only a merchant, provided always that the
buyer in fact relied upon the seller's judgment and does not
inspect for himself.

As it is needless to cite more cases

upon this subject we will notice the second division of our
topic where we wil' examine some cases in which the seller
manufactures goods for a general purpose as well as for a
particular purpose.

The question naturally presents itself,

what warranty does the law imply in a manufacturers general

-10contract of sale where the buyer has no opportunity to choose
or examine ?

It

stands to reason that there should be some

indemnity against latent defects in

the sales by the maker.

Because he hold himself out as a manufacturer, this implies
that h e has reasonably competent skill and meanc , and particularly because the buyer must rely wholly upon the maker,
aside from manifest defects.

The question not settled is,

whether the maker shall be partially or fully liable for latent defects which by care and skill he could have avoided.
The two leading cases which bear upon this point are in direct

onflict.

New York per, the learned Judge Seldon, laid

down the rule that a manufacturer is liable from any latent
but

defects arising from the manner of making, o?

ot latent

A

not shown ind cannot be preA eha
Th- Ohio court Aon the otle r hand by

defects in materials which he is
sumed to have known.

a bare majority, t1ut a manufacturer impliodly agrees to produce -rticles fit for ordinary usrs,; but if he fails for
even defects latent and undiscoverable his contract is broken.
In Hoe.v.

Sanborn,

( 21 N.Y.,

555)

the action wa

to enforce

payment for saws, made on the defendant's general order.

The

-11defendant contos~td on the grounds ts
as to be utterly worthless.
of an implied warranty;

saws were so soft

t ti-

In Ohio

the action was breach

boilers made for tlu

defendant's

rolling mills proved so defective that they had to be thrown
aside within a few months.

claimed that the

The deondant

cause was the latent defect in the iron.

The circumstances

in these cases are substantially alike.
The cases previous to the New York case, seem to susatain
the Ohio decision.

Tracing backward from Hoe. Satbborn, the

first case we notice is

Brown v. Sayles, ( 27 Vt.227) which

evidently was given much weight in Rogers v. Niles,( 11 Ohio.
St. 48).

It was held in a contract to build, sell, and deliv

er a buggy, at a fixed price there was an implied warranty
even against all secret and latent defects in the material
of which it was constructed, although they could not be discovered under -he most careful examination.

This ruling is

in line with earlier decisions that a maker impliedly warrants
that his goods are of a fair,
their appearance.

ordinary quality accordin-r to

But you will find cases reasoning for

the principle of Hoe v. San't:orn also.

-12The leading case is Jones v. Bright, (5 T3ing. 533. ).
decided in Common Pleas in 1829, is the foundation of t1B
absolute liability rule.

It was an action for a breach of

warranty in the sale of copper by the maker.
told that it was wanted for a ship bottom, and

He had been
had said be-

fore the plaintiff the one introducing the parties, ,1your
friend may rely upon it, we will supply him well."
copper lasted only a few months.

The

The verdict for the plain-

tiff found an intrinsic defect in the copper caused by the
introduction of to much oxygen in the course of its manufacture.

The judges in banc hold it clear that the defendant

had either expressly or tacitly undertaken, without qualification, that tIB

copper furnished should be fit for shaathinm

tlB plaintiff's ship;
ness whatever.

he must therefore answer for

ay unfit-

Although this case is the foundation of the

absolute liability rule, some of the reasoning strongly
favors the limited liability inposed in Hoc. v. Sanborn.
These cases of contracts for manufactured articles must
be distinguished from contracts for natural objects, as a
horse or timber etc.,.

No prudence can guard agaisnt latent

-13defects in a horse or timber, but by providing proper materin1
a merchant can guard agaisnt defects in a manufactured article,

as he who manufactures copper may by due care prevent th

introduction of' too much oxygen.

And this distinction ex-

plains the case of Bluett v. Osborne, (1 Starkie, 384) where
the judge held the defendant who sold the bowsprit, was not
responzible for a failure arising out of a latent defect in
thet imber.
The true principle suried up amounts to this:

Given

sound material, defects in making will not be excused, but
undiscoverable defects in natural objects and materials ( e.a
a horse or timber

) cabnot be guarded against and therefore

to be excused.
As before stated the common law implies a warranty only
where t1e

buyer has no opportunity to decide for himself, or

wihere there is superior knowledge actual or presumptive on
the seller's part.

How cah this be reconciled

with the

view that on general sale the manufacturer impliedly warrants
even against defects which human skill cannot detect or avoid?
This rule substantially protects the manufacturer, whose

-14rights are disregarded by t e Ohio view, without depriving
the buyer of his protection afforded by the cormon law.( 36
Cent.L.J. 192).

it also holds the manufacturer liable for

evcry defect in the course of making because le

alone controls

and can examine, except ,,,here the vendee chooses or dictates
in the mode of constrwution he to tht

extent assumes the

responsibility of the manufacturer.
In thn manufacture and sale of articles for a special
purpose the manufacturer's liability is absolute.

When he

contracts to manufacture for a particular purpose he warrants
that the article shall be fit for that particular purpose.
That particular purpose is the essence of the contract rather
than a particular article.,

it is not enough than to bring

a contract into this class of cascs by implication.

There

must be fair grounds to presume that the maker was contract in7
with the idea of fitness as the principle element.
The case of Randall v. Newson,(2 L.R.Q.B.D. 102), clearly
comes under this heai ing.

The plaintiff

ordered and bought

of the defendant who was a coach builder, a pole for his car.
riage.

While the plaintiff was driving it, soon after, thle

-15to

The horses in consequence

pole broke short offA the carriage.

In an action

became inmanageable and were much injured.

for damages the jury found that the pole was not reasonably
fit for the carriage,

but that it

had broken from an inherent

defect in the material, and that the defendant was not negJudgment was given

ligent in not discovering the defect.

the plaintiff on th- ground that the pole was supplied for a
-articular purpose.

Whether or not an article is supplied

for a particular purpose is a question of fact;

but ifsold

for such purpose the understanding is that it is fit for that
particular purpose.

Had the facts in

the defbndant knew of the defects in

tls

mse shown that

the timber the decision

would have been the same, but the action might have been
brought on the ground of fraud.
We .ill now examine the law which relates to the sale of
provision.

Theprevailing opinion in the earlier American

cases seemed to be that there was always an implied warranty
that the provisions were wholesome.
page 165
down in

) is

Blackstone(Vol. IiI.

responsible for that doctrine,

one of our calier New York cases,

which is

laid

VanBracklyn v.Fonda,

-1612 Johns. 468)

But that upon

and is the most relied upon.

examination was apparently an action for deceit

in selling

an unsound quarter of beef, and not an ac-' ion upon the warranty, for the judge found that the vendor knew the animal
was diseased, and did not communicate the fact to the vendee.
The other cases hich hold that way
same element of deceit.

seem to be based upon the

But the later cases disregard tl

implied warranty in the sale of provision;

indeed it now

seems to be pretty well settled that only such implied warranties as applied to the ordinary sale of chattels between
dealers aplies to the sale of provision whether for retail
or Wholesale.

In some jurisdictions however, there is still

some slight confusion in regards to this point but I think

the prevailing opinion is aptly stated in Benjami
in the following

"

on Sales

It is at least doubtful whether there be

any such warrant~ even though provisions sold for immediate
consumption by the buyer;

unless when he trusts to the judg-

ment or selection ofthe seller.
a particular pice

If A. selects of a butcher

of beef, ind orders tT-t inentical piece

to be sent, it is not easy to see, in the absence of any cus-

-17tom or usage to make it good, why there should be an implied
warranty as to the quality, any more than to any othersale.
The buyer takes his risk, tbe same as in buying any other thing
But if he orders his dinner of his market-man, for hito select and send up, and which tre buyer does not see until
it comes to the table, there is good grounds for holding the
vendor liable on an implied warranty that the article sent
should be fit for the purpose for which it was ordeze d;

but

this is applying to the sale of provisions the same rule as
is applied to the sale of other property, and probably the
same rule govers in one case as in the other".
Another important division of our subject is the sale
of goods by sample.

This method is adopted very extensively

by all great mercantile houses in carrying on their business
and is adapted to nearly all branches of trade.
The office of the sample is to present to tie

senses the

real meaning of the parties with regard to the subject ma-ter
of the contract.

This is often difficult to describe in

words but very simple by use of tbe
need to be saidPthat if the good,

sample.

it does not

themselms could be

-18examined previous to the purchase, that in most case-, would
be preferable to the sample, but in some cases that would be
a highly impracticable thing to do-- for instance,

goods

stored in the hold of a ship, while in others it would be
impossible to make an examination,
canned goods.

( Boyd Wilson,

sales

greatly facilitates sTaa&.

2:

as coal unmined,

Pa.St.

condition.

sample in

rle

The

31.....

It speaks for itself.

that the bulk shall correspond to tie

or sealed

It says

quality and

But it does not reveal to the merchant more than

he would be able to disvover upon the examination of the
goods themselves.

It cannot be held to disclose any latent

defects in the sample or in the bulk.
The English cases hold that if the seller is a merchant
and not a manufacturer he is

not responsible fcr

latent de-

fects which examination of sample fail to disclose. ( Parkinson v. Lee 2 East, 314) .
The American decisions are in line on that, :-oint, but if
the merchant himself is the manufacturer there is some questio
as to this holding.

In

fact I think the holding wouldbe op-

posite to the line of cases whcih have been examined.

The

-19merchant would have the full liability of the manufacturer.
But further there may be an express warranty in the
quality of the goods sold by sample as well as in other cases;
in such cases a breach of warranty of quality is actionable,
although the goods might be equal to'the sample.
In a recent Massachusetts case ( Goluld v. Stein, 147
ass, 570).

The sale was of

I,

one hundred and two bales of

Cera scrap rubber, as per sample, of second quality," it was
decided that the article was equa
second quality.

to sample, but was not of

So what appeared to be a sale by sample

was in fact a sale by express warranty.
In Pennsylvania, however there is no implied warranty
that the goods sold by sample are eqyal in quality to the
sample;

but they hold that the sample is a guaranty only

that tlv

article to be delivered shall follow its kind Vad be

merchantable, ( Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Pa.St., 319)

.

That

doctrine practically destruys the value of samples in making
Sales.

If it is impossible to determine

he quality of an

article by sample, of what use is the sample, pray?

If it

simply guarantees that the article to be delivered shall fol-

-20low its kind and be merchantable, in selling canned corn for
e.g. ( as a case at bar) why bother with the sample, why not
guarantee th&. the goods shall be canned corr instead of canned beans, and if they prove merchantable, however much or
little that term may mean, the contract is fulfilled, --never
mind the quality.

This is not the general doctrine.

In case the bulk does not agree with the sample, the
vendee of course need not take the goods, and has a reasonable
time to come to a decision. (merriman v. Chapman, 32 Conn.
146).
It is hold in Illinois not only that the goods may be
rejected, but, if the vendee accepts he may recover the difference in value, between the sample and the goods sent. ( 6
Ill. 512
In

).
Englau,

if

the goods are sold by sampl(

delivered and accepted by the purchaser,

Cnd they are

he cannot

return

them, but if he does not completely accept them, that is,

if

he has taken the delivery oonditionally, he has a right to
give +hem a fair trial, and if they are found not to correspond with the sample he may returm them.

-21It might be well to state what constitutes a sale by
sample,

for if

it

is

not a sale by sample implied warranty

may not exist.
The nore showing of the sample does*.not make the sale one
by sample.

There must be an agreement to sell by sample, or

at least an understanding that the sale is to be by sample,
the same as for the sale of an article for a special purpose.
The opportunity to inspect the goods is an important
element in

determining \'hether or not the parties in

it a sale by sarmple.

nded

If the buyer has no opportunity to

inspect the goods and the sample is

exhibited at sale and

offered him for examination, the courts would presume that it
was a sale by sample, and would recognize a warranty of correspondence of the sample .;ith the goods.

